Sri Lanka’s driving licence backlog has reached 678,000 as Parliament orders a 45-day probe into DMT delays, procurement and technical failures.
COLOMBO — A backlog of approximately 678,000 driving licences has placed the Department of Motor Traffic under fresh parliamentary scrutiny, with lawmakers ordering a 45-day investigation into the administrative, technical and procurement failures behind prolonged delays in issuing both licences and vehicle number plates.
Department officials told Parliament’s Sectoral Oversight Committee on Infrastructure and Strategic Development that the DMT can currently print about 4,600 driving licence cards a day.
Two additional printing machines are expected to be installed by October 15, raising capacity to approximately 8,200 cards daily.
The committee, chaired by MP S.M. Marikkar, has asked for a comprehensive report examining when the problems began, why they persisted, the tender and procurement processes involved and whether administrative or technical failures contributed to the disruption.
The scale of the backlog has revived a broader question that has followed the DMT for years: how did essential public services become so dependent on a small number of external suppliers, and why was adequate state capacity not developed earlier?
Decades of Dependence on External Suppliers
Transport Minister Bimal Rathnayake has previously told Parliament that vehicle number plates had effectively been supplied through the same private arrangement for about 25 years.
Public records show that Sri Lanka’s number plate procurement dates back to an international contract awarded around 2000, initially involving German manufacturer Erich UTSCH AG. Access International later became involved as a joint-venture partner and continued as a key local supplier.
The long-running arrangement has attracted criticism because, once the previous contract ended, the State lacked sufficient alternative capacity to prevent severe disruption.
Number plate production was suspended for an extended period amid procurement and certification issues before the Government moved towards a new system.
A similar concern arose over driving licence printing.
Rathnayake has said the licence-printing operation remained in the hands of the same private sector arrangement for more than two decades while the DMT failed to develop sufficient in-house printing capacity.
That dependence left the Department exposed when contracts, card supplies or machinery encountered problems.
The issue is therefore larger than a temporary shortage of cards. It raises questions about vendor dependence, technology transfer, public-sector capability and long-term procurement planning.
The Rs. 166.44 Difference Per Driving Licence
One of the most striking figures presented by the Transport Minister concerns the cost of producing each driving licence.
Under the previous outsourced system, the Government was reportedly paying Rs. 534.54 per card.
Rathnayake said the new in-house arrangement would reduce the cost to approximately Rs. 368.10.
That represents a difference of Rs. 166.44 for each card.
At the scale at which Sri Lanka issues and renews driving licences, even a relatively small saving per card can become substantial over time.
Historical DMT statistics show hundreds of thousands of new licences, renewals, extensions, duplicates and conversions are processed during a typical year.
The cost comparison therefore raises a legitimate question about whether earlier governments could have reduced expenditure by investing sooner in state-owned machinery, systems and technical expertise.
It does not, by itself, prove corruption or establish that the previous supplier received an improper financial benefit.
Any allegation of commissions, fraud or deliberate overpricing would require documentary evidence and formal investigation.
Number Plate System Faced Security Certification Delays
The number plate disruption was complicated further by the introduction of additional security requirements.
The proposed system includes seven security features intended to improve the integrity of vehicle identification plates.
Six were reportedly capable of being assessed through the University of Moratuwa, while the seventh required certification from an internationally accredited laboratory.
That certification requirement contributed to delays in completing the procurement and production process.
At one stage, more than 165,000 newly registered vehicles were reported to be waiting for number plates.
The situation has since improved.
DMT officials told Parliament this week that vehicles registered after March 10, 2026 are now receiving number plates within approximately 14 days.
That represents progress for new registrations, but it does not erase the broader questions surrounding how the earlier disruption was allowed to develop.
678,000 Driving Licences Still Waiting
The driving licence backlog remains the more immediate operational problem.
Officials have placed the number awaiting printing at around 678,000.
Current production capacity is approximately:
- Pending driving licences: 678,000
- Existing daily printing capacity: around 4,600 cards
- Expected capacity after October 15: around 8,200 cards per day
At the present rate, the backlog cannot be eliminated quickly, particularly while new licence applications and renewals continue to enter the system.
The two additional machines should substantially increase output, but it would be misleading to assume that dividing 678,000 by the maximum daily printing capacity provides a guaranteed completion date.
Normal demand will continue during the clearance process, machines may not operate at full capacity every day, and printing is only one component of production and distribution.
Current projections suggest the backlog could extend towards the end of the year even after capacity is expanded.
Procurement Failures Now Under Examination
Parliament’s demand for a 45-day report is therefore significant.
The committee has not limited its inquiry to the mechanical problem of printing cards.
Officials have been instructed to examine:
- How the delays originated.
- When the problems first became serious.
- Administrative decisions that contributed to them.
- Technical shortcomings within the Department.
- Relevant tender and procurement procedures.
- Equipment and infrastructure requirements.
- Staff shortages and institutional capacity.
- Measures required to prevent similar disruptions.
Those questions go directly to the management of a public service used by millions of citizens.
A driving licence or vehicle number plate is not an optional consumer product. Both are official documents connected to the legal operation and identification of motor vehicles.
Extended disruption therefore affects motorists, law enforcement, insurers, vehicle buyers and the wider transport system.
Auditor General Had Already Raised Procurement Concerns
Questions surrounding DMT procurement are not entirely new.
Previous Auditor General reports have raised concerns about procurement practices involving vehicle number plates and driving licence-related materials.
An audit relating to number plate procurement questioned the revision of contract prices under an international competitive bidding arrangement and examined Cabinet-level consideration of price increases sought by Access International.
Other audit observations have highlighted weaknesses in planning and procurement quantities associated with driving licence materials.
These earlier findings do not establish criminal wrongdoing.
They do demonstrate that procurement and contract management at the DMT had attracted official scrutiny before the current backlog reached its present scale.
That makes the parliamentary investigation particularly important.
Was the State Left Vulnerable to Vendor Lock-In?
The concept at the centre of the current debate is vendor lock-in.
A government agency becomes vulnerable when a private supplier does not merely provide a product but controls technology, software, specialist equipment, operating knowledge or other capabilities that the State cannot readily replace.
Outsourcing is not inherently improper.
Private-sector expertise can often deliver public services more efficiently than building every capability within government.
The problem arises when contracts continue for years without sufficient competition, technology transfer, contingency planning or the development of alternative capacity.
If the DMT could not maintain essential operations when an external contract ended, that points to a weakness in institutional planning regardless of whether the original procurement itself was lawful.
Claims of a ‘Mafia’ Require Evidence
The supplied commentary characterises the long-running system as a “card mafia” and suggests that billions of rupees may have flowed unnecessarily to private interests.
Such language reflects the frustration surrounding the issue, but a publication-quality investigation must distinguish strong suspicion from established fact.
The difference between the previous and current per-card costs deserves examination.
So does the duration of the procurement arrangements.
The absence of sufficient government-owned capacity also warrants scrutiny.
None of these points, however, proves that criminal corruption, secret commissions or an organised racket existed.
The parliamentary inquiry and any subsequent audit, anti-corruption investigation or law-enforcement process would need to establish those matters through records, contracts, tender documents and evidence from the officials and companies concerned.
The Real Question Is Institutional Accountability
Sri Lanka’s immediate priority is to issue the hundreds of thousands of licences still waiting to be printed.
The more lasting challenge is preventing the same failure from recurring.
That requires more than buying additional printers.
The DMT needs adequate equipment, trained personnel, resilient software systems, transparent procurement, contingency arrangements and institutional knowledge that does not disappear when a private contract ends.
Future contracts should also make clear what technology, data, software access and operational capability remain with the State when an external supplier leaves.
The 45-day parliamentary inquiry now has an opportunity to determine whether the licence and number plate breakdown resulted principally from bad procurement, poor planning, inadequate technical capacity, administrative failure or a combination of those factors.
If evidence of corruption emerges, it should be investigated and prosecuted through the appropriate institutions.
If the problem proves to be incompetence or structural dependence rather than criminal misconduct, that too requires accountability.
The 678,000 unprinted licences are ultimately the visible symptom.
The deeper question is how an essential government service became vulnerable enough for hundreds of thousands of citizens to be left waiting for a basic legal document.
