
The recent maritime disaster off India’s southern coast has reignited urgent conversations around port safety and environmental protection in South Asia. The sinking of the MSC ELSA 3 off Vizhinjam, Kerala, is not just an isolated incident but a critical warning to countries like Sri Lanka, whose economy, ecology, and security are intricately tied to maritime activity.
This incident marked by the threat of oil spills and the specter of hazardous cargo spotlights deeper, structural issues in global maritime governance. Specifically, it highlights concerns raised in academic critiques like The Myths of Flag State Control System, which question the efficacy of the flag state system in maintaining shipping safety and ecological accountability. When ships fly flags of convenience, the lines of responsibility blur, and maritime oversight can become dangerously lax.
Sri Lanka, an island nation relying heavily on seaborne trade and port infrastructure, must now pause and reassess its maritime policies in light of these global vulnerabilities.
Key Areas Sri Lanka Must Reevaluate
The Vizhinjam disaster draws attention to three critical domains where Sri Lanka must act decisively:
1. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs)
Large-scale port projects in ecologically fragile zones require rigorous and independent environmental review processes. Vizhinjam underscores what happens when these are rushed or compromised. Sri Lanka’s EIAs must go beyond procedural checkboxes and integrate comprehensive modelling for worst-case scenarios, oil tanker leaks, hazardous material discharge, and disaster risks intensified by climate change.
2. Port State Control (PSC)
The inadequacies of flag state oversight increase the importance of domestic PSC regimes. Sri Lanka must enhance the capacity of its PSC mechanisms to thoroughly inspect incoming ships—especially those flying flags of convenience or associated with past safety violations. Ports in Colombo, Trincomalee, and Hambantota must function as regulatory gateways rather than loopholes for questionable shipping practices.
3. Infrastructure Resilience to Climate Change
Sri Lanka’s strategic maritime facilities face escalating risks from rising sea levels, stronger monsoons, and unpredictable weather patterns. Port design and emergency preparedness must account for these climate-induced hazards. Infrastructure must be future-proofed, with robust disaster response frameworks ready to manage marine accidents and oil spills.
From Observation to Action: A Maritime Agenda for Sri Lanka
The insights drawn from the Vizhinjam event and research into the limitations of flag state systems point toward a necessary shift in national maritime policy. Below are strategic steps Sri Lanka must implement:
– Enforce Stronger Environmental Protocols
Adopt and uphold rigorous environmental laws governing maritime activity. This should include updated norms for handling hazardous cargo, waste management, marine chemical control, and oil spill prevention.
– Expand Port State Control Surveillance
Introduce stricter and more frequent vessel inspections. Prioritize oversight on ships using flags of convenience, particularly those with repeat safety issues or substandard ratings in international shipping registries.
– Update and Train for Emergency Response
Develop national maritime disaster protocols informed by global best practices. Conduct regular simulations for oil spills, shipwreck scenarios, and hazardous leaks, with integrated command among port, naval, and environmental authorities.
– Enhance Multi-Agency Coordination
Encourage continuous communication and collaboration between agencies like the Marine Environment Protection Authority (MEPA), the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA), the Sri Lanka Navy, and the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. Coordinated efforts are essential for comprehensive maritime security and environmental management.
By learning from Vizhinjam and reflecting on academic evaluations of maritime oversight systems, Sri Lanka can pave the way for a safer, cleaner, and more accountable marine future. As trade routes expand and shipping traffic increases, proactive governance, inter-agency coordination, and climate-aware infrastructure will be the cornerstones of resilience.
The ocean is Sri Lanka’s greatest natural asset and its greatest risk. How the country chooses to manage that dual reality will define its maritime legacy for decades to come.
The Fragile Illusion of Flag State Control: Sri Lanka’s Maritime Predicament
In recent years, Sri Lanka has found itself at the confluence of multiple maritime crises ranging from human trafficking and drug smuggling to marine pollution and transnational terrorism. A closer inspection reveals a recurring pattern: many of the vessels implicated in these illicit activities are either stateless or operate under what is commonly referred to as “flags of convenience.”
Unlike air travel or ground transportation, where regulation is closely tied to physical territory and infrastructure, ships in international waters legally represent the sovereignty of the country whose flag they fly. This flag is not merely symbolic, it confers nationality, jurisdiction, and regulatory responsibility to the “flag state.” In theory, flag states are entrusted with ensuring their vessels operate under international legal norms. They are expected to uphold maritime safety, protect marine ecosystems, and supervise both technical and social aspects of vessel operations.
However, modern shipping has divorced this principle from its original function. Today, there is often little or no connection between the flag a ship flies and the actual country of ownership or operation. This disconnect exacerbated by weak oversight, economic incentives, and jurisdictional ambiguity has rendered maritime regulation one of the least enforced sectors of international transport.
A ship lacking official registration with any nation is essentially without legal status on the high seas. The country of registration or flag state determines which laws govern events that take place onboard. Whether it’s a birth, a death, a crime, or environmental damage, the vessel’s flag dictates legal responsibility.
This foundational system, however, is increasingly seen as a facade. In this paper, we delve into the mechanisms of flag state administration, interrogating how and why this system has failed in critical instances. Our analysis suggests that what appears to be an internationally governed safety net is, in practice, often a hollow framework—especially for countries like Sri Lanka facing specific maritime vulnerabilities.
The Framework of Flag State Authority
Cargo vessels traversing global waters are required to display a flag representing the country in which they are registered. This registration is more than ceremonial, it subjects the vessel to the regulatory purview of the registering nation. This system, known as flag state control, emerged from early maritime traditions and is enshrined in international maritime law. The flag serves as the vessel’s legal identity and is intended to ensure adherence to international norms on safety, labor, and environmental conduct.
Flag states are obligated to exert administrative control, monitor technical compliance, and enforce labor and safety regulations over their vessels. However, the global maritime economy today is largely driven by convenience rather than accountability. Many ship owners choose not to register vessels under their country of citizenship. Instead, they opt for “flags of convenience” (FOC), registering under foreign jurisdictions with looser oversight, fewer inspections, and lower costs.
This leads to the emergence of several registry types, each with varying levels of enforcement:
- Traditional or Closed Registries – Limited to ships owned and operated by citizens or companies within that state.
- International or Open Registries – Open to foreign shipowners, typically offering lenient regulatory environments.
- Secondary Registries – National subsidiaries offering relaxed terms while retaining national association.
- Hybrid Registries – Blended systems combining elements of traditional and open registration practices.
Has the System Truly Failed?
It would be an oversimplification to declare the entire flag state administration system a failure. Traditional registries, such as those maintained by the U.S., Singapore, New Zealand, and Greece are generally well-monitored and enforce robust regulations. These states typically require owners to adhere to national taxation policies and strict maritime laws.
Yet the spotlight falls squarely on open registries, where the bulk of the problems originate. Open or international registries often allow foreign shipowners to bypass tax burdens, regulatory inspections, and labor protections. The motivation is economic: operating costs are significantly lower, particularly when wages, compliance, and insurance are minimized.
This trend took off in the mid-20th century, particularly among American shipping companies who sought relief from high domestic operational costs, especially rising crew salaries. Seeking to remain competitive on the global stage, they increasingly turned to flags of convenience. What started as a financial strategy has now proliferated into a regulatory loophole exploited at scale with implications for maritime safety, environmental preservation, and state sovereignty.
Sri Lanka’s Unique Maritime Challenges
While the systemic flaws in flag state control are global, their impacts are acutely felt by coastal nations like Sri Lanka. The island sits at a vital juncture of east-west shipping lanes, making it both strategically significant and vulnerable to maritime transgressions.
To grasp the security threats, it’s essential to distinguish between two closely related but distinct concepts: maritime safety and maritime security. Safety refers to unintentional incidents, such as collisions, oil spills, and onboard hazards that pose risks to human life and marine ecosystems. Security, on the other hand, involves deliberate acts of harm: piracy, armed conflict, human trafficking, illegal fishing, and cross-border smuggling.
Sri Lanka’s geographic location and open coastline make it particularly susceptible to security threats arising from poorly regulated vessels. With large volumes of commercial traffic passing near its waters, many under flags of convenience the island finds itself exposed to risks ranging from illicit trafficking networks to environmental disasters.
The ongoing maritime activity in Sri Lanka’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) requires vigilant oversight. Yet without strong institutional mechanisms to address the loopholes created by the flag state system, Sri Lanka remains reactive rather than preventive in its maritime posture.
Sri Lanka’s Maritime Security Crossroads: Navigating Threats, Pollution, and Policy Gaps
In Sri Lanka’s strategic maritime landscape, the distinction between maritime security and maritime safety remains vital yet often blurred in public discourse. Though the terms are frequently used interchangeably, their implications are distinct. Maritime safety encompasses accidental or naturally occurring threats—marine pollution, crew safety, and vessel collisions. Maritime security, on the other hand, covers deliberate acts such as piracy, terrorism, smuggling, illegal fishing, drug trafficking, and cross-border maritime disputes.
The Oil Spill Dilemma: A Persistent Hazard
In Sri Lanka’s recent maritime history, oil pollution incidents have been driven less by operational negligence and more by unexpected maritime accidents. Given that ultra-large crude carriers frequently pass close to the country’s coastline on their route between the Middle East and East Asia, the risk of catastrophic oil spills remains a constant environmental threat.
Historical incidents confirm this vulnerability. Over the last two decades, Sri Lanka has experienced several oil and chemical spills—some minor, others environmentally significant. Often, these vessels sailed under flags of convenience, making accountability elusive. Many of the ships involved in these incidents were linked to subpar regulatory oversight, raising critical questions about the reliability of the flag state control system.
Major Oil/Chemical Spills in Sri Lankan Waters:
Date & Ship | Location | Volume Spilled | Impact |
---|---|---|---|
1994 – M/V Komsomolets Azerbaydzhana | Off Galle, southern coast | 100 tonnes of fuel oil | No coastal impact reported |
1998 – Bunkering Terminal | Colombo | 595–991 ppm detected in nearby waters | Exceeded Sri Lankan marine oil limits (20 ppm) |
1999 – M/V Meliksha | Off Bundala, southern coast | 16,500 MT fertilizer, 200 MT heavy fuel oil | Oil slick lasted 10 weeks; beaches polluted up to 50 km; river impact |
2006 – MV Amanat Shah | Koggala, southern coast | 25–50 MT heavy fuel oil | 13 km of beach polluted; later cleaned |
2007 – Marina Sedna | Near Galle Port | 4 tonnes heavy fuel oil | Oil successfully removed without contamination |
2009 – M/T Gramba Chemical Tanker | Off Trincomalee | 6,250 MT Sulphuric Acid | No fire or explosion occurred |
2012 – MV Thermopylae Sierra | Off Panadura, western coast | 20–40 MT heavy fuel oil | 10 km long slick reached Negombo |
Source: Marine Environment Protection Authority (MEPA), Sri Lanka
These incidents reflect the compounding risks associated with ships operating under ambiguous jurisdiction, and they illustrate the difficulty of enforcing accountability when vessels operate beyond the purview of robust flag state systems.
IUU Fishing and the Flag of Convenience Loophole
In addition to pollution, Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is another pressing concern. A vast number of these operations are enabled by vessels sailing under easily obtained flags of convenience. Such registration can be acquired online for a few hundred dollars, often with little to no scrutiny. In some cases, vessels switch flags and names multiple times during a single fishing season a practice known as flag hopping.
This tactic, facilitated through shell companies and anonymous ownership structures, makes it almost impossible to identify the true actors behind illicit fishing operations. Websites like flagsofconvenience.com can process flag registrations in as little as 24 hours, enabling rapid identity obfuscation.
Globally, the scale of pirate fishing is staggering estimated to cost the world between US$10 billion to US$23.5 billion annually, representing as much as 11 to 26 million tons of fish. With an insatiable global demand for seafood, illegal operators increasingly target developing coastal nations like Sri Lanka, exploiting weak enforcement and vast territorial waters.
Institutional and Legal Measures Taken by Sri Lanka
To counteract these threats, Sri Lanka has taken steps to bolster its maritime governance through both domestic legislation and regional cooperation.
Implementation of UNCLOS Provisions
Sri Lanka has committed to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), particularly its provisions on high seas conservation (Articles 118, 129, and Part XII Section II). Through its involvement in organizations like the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, Sri Lanka has signaled its readiness to uphold international maritime obligations.
Legal Architecture for Maritime Enforcement
Complementing its multilateral commitments, Sri Lanka has adopted national legislation such as the Piracy Act and the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Act. These frameworks were developed to respond to evolving global threats, especially post-9/11, and to confront local maritime security issues fueled by the island’s three-decade internal conflict.
Collaborative Platforms: The Galle Dialogue
Recognizing that maritime challenges transcend national boundaries, Sri Lanka has embraced multilateral dialogue as a central plank of its strategy. The Galle Dialogue Maritime Conference, hosted annually by Sri Lanka, provides a valuable platform for regional and global actors to exchange strategic ideas, build trust, and advance collective security goals. It exemplifies Sri Lanka’s commitment to collaborative maritime governance in a rapidly shifting security environment.
Naval Diplomacy as Soft Power
Sri Lanka’s navy has increasingly become a tool of strategic diplomacy. Positioned at the heart of the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka hosts numerous routine port visits from international naval fleets and partakes in joint training exercises to build confidence and mutual interoperability.
The country is an active participant in multilateral and bilateral exercises such as:
- IONS (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium)
- SLINEX (Sri Lanka-India Naval Exercise)
- CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training)
- AMAN (Pakistan’s multilateral naval drill)
For a small island nation, these engagements are not just symbolic, they represent a pragmatic means of cultivating maritime alliances, enhancing interoperability, and contributing to regional stability.
Defending the Coastline: Fisheries and Enforcement Measures
Sri Lanka’s legal framework prohibits foreign vessels from fishing in its territorial waters. The Foreign Fisheries Act, amended in response to rampant poaching particularly by fishermen from Tamil Nadu has been critical in strengthening enforcement.
Previously, violators were often prosecuted under maritime zone laws, but recent legislative changes now allow prosecution under fisheries-specific statutes, streamlining legal proceedings. The act also introduced the principle of presumption, easing the evidentiary burden in IUU fishing cases.
Awareness campaigns, including legal briefings for Sri Lanka Navy and Coast Guard personnel, have helped bridge institutional gaps. Notably, training sessions conducted on 24th March 2018 played a pivotal role in aligning enforcement agencies on these matters.
Port State Measures Against IUU Fishing
Building on its commitment to end IUU fishing, Sri Lanka amended the Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Act via Act No. 35 of 2014, aligning with the FAO’s Port State Measures Agreement. The government formalized these regulations in Gazette No. 1907/47 (March 26, 2015), thereby empowering authorities to inspect and take action against foreign fishing vessels using Sri Lankan ports.
These port state measures are vital in complementing flag state and coastal enforcement efforts, especially when dealing with foreign-flagged vessels that seek port access without complying with international conservation and transparency norms.
Final Analysis
The preceding exploration reveals that the framework established under Article 94(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which assigns primary responsibility for ship regulation to the flag state—is, in practical terms, largely ineffective. While theoretically rooted in international law and sovereignty, the reality is that flag state control has proven unreliable. In contrast, port state control has emerged as a more viable mechanism for enforcing international safety and environmental standards. However, port states themselves are often constrained—limited largely to denying access to port facilities without broader enforcement powers on the high seas.
Within the realms of marine pollution and maritime safety, flag state obligations are embedded in customary international law. Yet the core issues are not legislative deficiencies but implementation failures. Auditing, transparency, and third-party assessments remain essential to exposing non-compliance. Unfortunately, many flag states persist in breaching safety protocols, leading to devastating maritime disasters with lasting environmental damage. In this context, regional frameworks like the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding (IOMOU) on port state control are essential. These mechanisms help coordinate regional responses and improve enforcement. Still, field experience highlights that enforcement often requires independent verification, rather than mere self-reporting by the flag state.
The situation becomes even more complex when addressing the fisheries sector, where practical and legal challenges are deeply intertwined. Unlike the shipping industry, which operates under a relatively established legal architecture, fisheries governance suffers from the absence of universally accepted standards for flag state accountability. Although instruments such as the FAO Compliance Agreement and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement set out expectations, lack of ratification by key maritime nations weakens their effect. Without a codified global benchmark, the “duty of care” by flag states in managing fishing vessels remains inconsistently applied.
Sri Lanka, recognizing this vacuum, has proactively introduced legislative deterrents. The proposed amendment to the Fisheries Act No. 59 of 1979, known as the Foreign Fisheries Boat Regulation Act, imposes stiff penalties on unlicensed foreign vessels operating within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Simultaneously, Sri Lanka’s Navy and Coast Guard have been legally empowered to detain violators, reflecting a growing readiness to uphold sovereign rights over its marine resources.
Yet even beyond fisheries and pollution, maritime threats extend into murkier territory: terrorism, piracy, arms trafficking, human smuggling, and drug interdiction. Here, international treaties remain fragmented, lacking a cohesive operational framework. Thus, coastal states must navigate these waters through a patchwork of international laws, national mandates, and military rules of engagement.
UNCLOS does provide limited tools, Article 111 grants the “right of hot pursuit,” allowing coastal states to chase and detain foreign vessels violating their laws. Similarly, Article 110 allows warships to board vessels in cases of piracy, statelessness, slave trade, and unauthorized broadcasting. Additionally, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, nations may invoke the right to self-defense when faced with hostile maritime threats, provided the response is proportionate and justified.
Sri Lanka’s experience in interdicting illicit vessels suggests that intelligence-led operations, coordinated with international partners, are critical. Timely and accurate intelligence shared through multilateral networks has proven to be the linchpin of successful maritime law enforcement operations.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The future of maritime governance cannot rely solely on outdated paradigms. While some maritime scholars advocate for a complete overhaul of the flag state system, others argue for strengthening existing mechanisms through enhanced enforcement and cooperation. Regardless of the school of thought, what remains clear is that the current information deficit cripples proactive intervention against rogue or negligent vessels.
In light of these challenges, Sri Lanka must adopt a whole-of-system approach, integrating multiple stakeholders across its maritime ecosystem from the Navy and Coast Guard to the Marine Environment Protection Authority (MEPA), Directorate of Merchant Shipping, Fisheries Department, Coastal Conservation Department, and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA).
The following recommendations are proposed at national, regional, and global levels:
- Modern Ship Tracking: Leverage advanced maritime technologies such as AIS (Automatic Identification Systems), LRIT (Long-Range Identification and Tracking), VMS (Vessel Monitoring Systems), and satellite surveillance to continuously monitor ship movements.
- Domestic Inter-Agency Integration: Create a centralized national maritime coordination platform where real-time data and intelligence can be shared among all relevant authorities (MEPA, SLPA, DGMS, Fisheries, Navy, etc.).
- Regional Data Fusion Center: Establish a maritime data fusion and analysis hub for the Indian Ocean region to facilitate better detection of suspicious activities and enhance collaborative enforcement.
- International Operational Partnerships: Expand navy-to-navy cooperation and build inter-agency interoperability with maritime law enforcement bodies in friendly nations. Shipping companies should also be looped into these partnerships to ensure preventive compliance.
- Experience and Learning Exchange: Organize regular multilateral maritime exercises, scenario planning sessions, and lessons-learned forums to share real-time operational experiences in dealing with evasive and non-compliant vessels.
- Legal Incorporation of Global Treaties: Finally, Sri Lanka must domesticate key international maritime conventions into national law to close legislative loopholes and empower enforcement agencies with a clear, codified mandate.
By addressing its domestic regulatory blind spots while actively participating in regional and global security dialogues, Sri Lanka can reclaim maritime stewardship, not only for its own coastline but for the wider Indian Ocean region. In an era of rising sea-borne threats and competition, the island nation must transform from a passive observer to a proactive guardian of maritime order.