KATUNAYAKE, November 18, 2026 — Sri Lanka’s long-delayed Airport Terminal 2 project faces renewed scrutiny over allegations of a US$190 million cost increase, the rejection of a competing bidder and questions about procurement oversight.
Sri Lanka’s long-delayed second passenger terminal at Bandaranaike International Airport is facing renewed procurement scrutiny following allegations that Japan’s Taisei Corporation is seeking approximately US$190 million above its earlier tender price, after the only competing consortium was rejected on technical grounds.
The allegations concern the ongoing procurement of the Bandaranaike International Airport Development Project Phase II Stage 2, a major infrastructure investment intended to increase passenger capacity at Sri Lanka’s principal international airport.
Taisei was initially awarded the construction contract in 2020, but work stalled following Sri Lanka’s 2022 economic crisis and the suspension of financing by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
The original contract was subsequently terminated, and fresh tenders were invited in September 2024.
Two bidders emerged: Taisei Corporation and a consortium comprising Japan’s Sojitz Corporation and India’s Larsen & Toubro (L&T).
The Sojitz–L&T consortium was subsequently determined to be technically unresponsive, leaving Taisei as the only bidder proceeding through the remaining procurement process.
JICA reportedly concurred with Taisei’s selection in July 2026.
The latest controversy concerns allegations that the company’s proposed price has increased substantially during the prolonged evaluation and negotiation process.
The source account also alleges that senior ministry officials have attempted to secure approval for the increased amount despite objections from technical evaluators.
Those allegations have not been independently established through the complete tender records, formal committee decisions or correspondence between the relevant authorities.
The financial implications nevertheless warrant scrutiny because the project involves substantial foreign borrowing and public expenditure.
Airport Expansion Stalled After Sri Lanka’s Economic Collapse
The second terminal was conceived as a major expansion of Bandaranaike International Airport’s passenger-handling facilities.
Its completion is expected to increase annual passenger capacity from approximately six million to 16 million.
The project also includes associated facilities and infrastructure needed to accommodate higher passenger volumes.
Taisei Corporation was awarded the original construction contract in March 2020, reportedly valued at approximately US$564 million.
Construction commenced later that year, supported by concessional Japanese financing arranged through JICA.
Sri Lanka’s economic crisis disrupted those arrangements.
Following the Government’s suspension of external debt servicing in April 2022, JICA suspended disbursements under the relevant loan facilities.
Construction activity was halted, leaving the project incomplete.
Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) (Private) Limited, the State-owned airport operator, subsequently faced the challenge of restarting construction while addressing the financial and contractual consequences of the suspension.
The original contract with Taisei was terminated, and the Government proceeded towards a fresh procurement exercise.
In September 2024, JICA publicly welcomed the announcement of a new tender intended to complete the airport development project.
The tender process formed part of broader efforts to resume Japanese-funded infrastructure projects following progress in Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring.
By 2026, however, the terminal remained incomplete, with further negotiations required over contractor selection, costs and financing.
Two Bidders Entered the New Tender
The fresh procurement attracted bids from Taisei Corporation and the Sojitz–L&T consortium.
The companies represented two competing options for completing a strategically important infrastructure project.
The tender process required technical evaluation before financial bids could be considered.
According to reporting published in January 2026, Airport and Aviation Services informed JICA that Taisei was the only technically responsive bidder.
Subsequent reporting in July stated that the Japanese funding agency had concurred with that assessment.
The Sojitz–L&T consortium was therefore eliminated before the remaining financial evaluation and negotiation stages.
The source commentary alleges that the rejected consortium’s offer was approximately US$250 million lower than Taisei’s original price.
That difference could be financially significant, but it cannot be treated as an established saving without examining both bids.
A lower submitted price does not necessarily represent a valid alternative if the bid fails mandatory technical requirements.
Equally, the disqualification of a cheaper bidder should be supported by clear, documented and consistently applied evaluation criteria.
A transparent assessment would establish precisely which requirements the Sojitz–L&T consortium failed to satisfy and whether those deficiencies justified its exclusion.
The procurement authorities should also be able to demonstrate that the technical criteria were applied consistently to both bidders.
Technical Evaluation Decision Requires Transparency
A central allegation concerns the circumstances in which the competing consortium was declared technically unresponsive.
The original commentary claims that the Technical Evaluation Committee had argued with JICA for more than a year over the suitability of Sojitz–L&T.
It suggests that the consortium was a credible bidder and that its exclusion removed meaningful price competition.
Contemporary reporting confirms that the technical evaluation was prolonged and that JICA reviewed the outcome.
It does not, however, independently establish that JICA improperly overruled a favourable technical recommendation or that the consortium satisfied every mandatory requirement.
The distinction matters.
Procurement committees are expected to evaluate bids according to the specifications and conditions established in the tender.
JICA, as the financing agency, also has a role in reviewing procurement procedures under the applicable loan arrangements.
Its concurrence with a procurement decision is not, by itself, evidence of improper intervention.
The appropriate investigation would examine the technical evaluation report, any dissenting observations, correspondence with JICA and the formal reasons recorded for rejecting the consortium.
Those documents would determine whether the exclusion complied with the tender requirements.
Alleged Increase from ¥105 Billion to ¥131 Billion
The most substantial financial allegation concerns Taisei Corporation’s reported revised price.
According to the source account, the company originally submitted a bid of approximately ¥105 billion before increasing its proposed amount to ¥131 billion.
If accurate, the figures represent an increase of ¥26 billion.
That amounts to approximately 24.76% of the original figure.
The source argues that the increase is excessive when compared with construction inflation over the relevant period.
It claims that a reasonable allowance would be approximately 9%, producing an adjusted amount of ¥114.45 billion.
On that assumption, the proposed ¥131 billion would exceed the inflation-adjusted comparison by ¥16.55 billion.
The arithmetic is correct.
However, the economic conclusion requires independent examination.
A general construction inflation benchmark does not necessarily establish the maximum permissible increase in a specialised international airport project.
Changes in materials, equipment, labour costs, exchange rates, insurance, financing, project scope and contractual risk may affect a contractor’s final price.
The relevant question is whether the increase can be justified through detailed cost estimates and the specific conditions of the new procurement.
The original and revised tender documents have not been independently obtained, and the precise scope of work covered by each amount has not been established.
It would therefore be premature to conclude that the entire difference represents overcharging.
Rupee Cost Reportedly Increases by Rs. 75 Billion
The source also compares the alleged tender values in Sri Lankan rupees.
It claims that the estimated cost increased from approximately Rs. 200 billion to Rs. 275 billion, representing an additional Rs. 75 billion.
That would amount to an increase of 37.5%.
The source describes the equivalent increase as approximately US$226 million, or 37.6%.
Those comparisons require reconciliation because currency movements can significantly affect the rupee value of a yen-denominated contract.
The difference between the two rupee estimates may include exchange-rate effects as well as changes in the underlying contract price.
It should not automatically be treated as an additional US dollar payment demanded by the contractor.
The article also compares the reported US$226 million increase with the historical development cost of Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, estimated in the source at approximately US$209 million.
Although the comparison illustrates the scale of the alleged increase, the two projects differ in design, capacity, construction scope and financing arrangements.
It therefore cannot establish that the revised Terminal 2 price is excessive.
A reliable financial assessment would require the original and revised cost schedules to be compared using consistent exchange rates and clearly defined project scopes.
US$440 Million Gap Claimed Against Rejected Bid
The original commentary goes further, arguing that the difference between the rejected consortium’s offer and Taisei’s current proposed price could reach approximately US$440 million.
Its calculation combines the reported US$250 million difference between the competing bids with an alleged additional US$190 million being sought by Taisei.
The resulting figure is substantial.
However, it remains a comparison based on unverified price components.
The US$190 million figure also requires reconciliation with the separately cited yen-denominated increase and the reported US$226 million equivalent rise in rupee costs.
These figures may refer to different comparison dates, financial components or stages of negotiation.
Without the underlying tender schedules, they should not be added together and presented as a confirmed loss to the State.
The alleged US$440 million gap is therefore a matter for investigation rather than an established financial consequence of the procurement decision.
The Government should disclose enough information to establish whether the figures are comparable and whether the competing bids covered equivalent work.
Allegations of Ministry Interference Require Evidence
The source account alleges that the Secretary of the ministry responsible for airports has attempted to support Taisei’s increased price despite technical objections.
It further claims that all six members of the Technical Evaluation Committee refused to approve the proposed increase.
According to the allegation, pressure was applied to override those objections and secure approval of the higher amount.
Such conduct, if established, would raise serious concerns about the independence of the procurement process.
However, no signed committee decision, authenticated objection from all six members or official correspondence establishing improper pressure has been independently examined.
The available reporting therefore does not support presenting interference as a proven fact.
Investigators would need to determine whether a formal revised-price recommendation was made, which officials supported or opposed it, and whether any decisions were taken outside the applicable procurement framework.
The position of the ministry secretary, relevant procurement committees, JICA and Taisei Corporation should be obtained before conclusions are drawn.
The source also disputes an explanation attributed to the contractor concerning rising costs associated with conflicts in the Middle East.
Whether those events affected the price would depend on the timing of procurement, affected supply chains and the actual cost components identified by the contractor.
A general reference to international uncertainty would not be sufficient to justify an increase without supporting financial documentation.
Fresh Tender or Negotiated Settlement
The source urges the Government to consider a fresh tender rather than approve the disputed increase.
It argues that another procurement exercise could preserve competition and potentially reduce the final contract value.
That position is understandable where the financial differences are substantial and where questions remain over the evaluation process.
However, restarting the tender would also carry costs and risks.
The terminal has already suffered years of delays, and a fresh procurement would require consideration of financing commitments, changes in construction costs, technical requirements and the time needed to appoint another contractor.
The source suggests that re-tendering might involve only an additional three months, but no verified procurement timetable establishes that such a process could be completed within that period.
It also proposes requiring Taisei to honour its original bid or face the forfeiture of its bid security.
Whether that remedy would be lawful depends on the tender conditions, bid validity periods, any permitted price adjustment provisions and the contractor’s contractual obligations.
Bid security cannot automatically be forfeited merely because the Government considers a revised price unacceptable.
The authorities must therefore assess the financial and legal consequences of each available option before proceeding.
Government’s Anti-Corruption Commitments Face Scrutiny
President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s administration came to office promising stronger controls over corruption, procurement irregularities and the misuse of public funds.
The airport expansion provides an important opportunity to demonstrate how those commitments operate in practice.
The available evidence establishes that the project has experienced substantial delays, a terminated contract, renewed procurement and a technical evaluation that left only one responsive bidder.
The more serious allegations concerning financial inflation and official interference remain unresolved.
The Government should be able to explain why the competing bid was rejected, how Taisei’s revised price was assessed and whether the final procurement decision represents value for money.
JICA’s financing role also makes it important to distinguish decisions taken by Sri Lankan procurement authorities from approvals required under the loan arrangements.
Transparency would not necessarily require publication of commercially sensitive information.
It would, however, require sufficient disclosure to demonstrate that evaluation criteria were properly applied and that any price increase was supported by legitimate and independently assessed costs.
Final Contract Decision Must Protect Public Funds
Sri Lanka needs additional airport capacity to support tourism, aviation connectivity, business travel and economic growth.
The continuing delay in completing Terminal 2 carries its own financial and operational consequences.
Nevertheless, the need to complete the project cannot justify approving an unsupported contract price.
Equally, allegations of corruption cannot replace the documentary evidence required to establish procurement wrongdoing.
The decisive questions are whether the rejection of the Sojitz–L&T consortium complied with the tender requirements, whether Taisei’s reported price revisions can be independently justified, and whether the responsible officials acted within their authority.
The Government should publish the final procurement decision together with an adequate explanation of the evaluation outcome and the financial basis of the approved amount.
If credible evidence of misconduct emerges, it should be referred to the appropriate investigative authorities.
Until then, the reported price increases and allegations of administrative interference remain matters requiring verification.
For a project financed through substantial public commitments and international borrowing, the ultimate test is whether the completed terminal delivers the required capacity at a price that can withstand independent financial and technical scrutiny.
