JVP faces a historic dilemma under Anura Kumara Dissanayake, unlike its past exits from Chandrika and Mahinda governments.
JVP history raises a sharp question today: can the party distance itself from President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government the way it once walked away from Chandrika Kumaratunga and Mahinda Rajapaksa?
“Madam, don’t try to form a government with the JVP. Both the government and the country would head toward a natural disaster…”
That was the warning an astrologer reportedly gave then-President Chandrika Kumaratunga in 2004, when she was preparing to contest the parliamentary election in alliance with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna.
Chandrika, however, did not pay much attention to that warning.
Her main political objective at the time was to bring down Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government and push Ranil and the United National Party into the opposition.
She signed an agreement with the JVP, formed the United People’s Freedom Alliance, contested the election, and won.
The 2004 parliamentary election became a political tsunami, similar in many ways to the election victory secured by the JVP-led alliance in 2024.
Anura Bandaranaike, the political heir of the Bandaranaike family, came second in the preferential vote count in the Gampaha District.
The first place went not to an SLFP heavyweight, but to JVP candidate Vijitha Herath.
A similar trend was seen in several other districts, where leading Sri Lanka Freedom Party figures were pushed into second place behind JVP candidates.
Many prominent SLFP politicians even failed to enter Parliament.
The JVP filled that political vacuum and won 41 seats.
The result shocked not only Chandrika Kumaratunga, but the entire Sri Lanka Freedom Party.
JVP MPs including Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Vijitha Herath, K.D. Lal Kantha, and Chandrasena Wijesinghe were sworn in as Cabinet ministers.
Bimal Ratnayake, Samantha Vidyaratne, Sunil Handunnetti, and Nihal Galappaththi became deputy ministers.
However, tensions between Chandrika and the JVP surfaced almost immediately after the Cabinet was formed.
The first dispute arose when Anura Kumara Dissanayake demanded that the Mahaweli Ministry be brought under his Agriculture Ministry.
At the time, the Mahaweli portfolio was held by then SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena, who was not prepared to give it up.
That was only the beginning.
JVP ministers later opposed Cabinet proposals presented by Chandrika to privatise loss-making state enterprises.
Under pressure from the JVP, Chandrika had also suspended dealings with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
The IMF even closed its Colombo office and left the country.
It was during this period that the 2004 tsunami struck Sri Lanka.
The disaster shook the entire nation.
To facilitate international aid for reconstruction, the United States, Britain, Europe, and other donors, with Norway’s involvement, proposed an assistance package.
They recommended the creation of a joint mechanism involving both the Government and the LTTE to manage relief distribution.
That proposal gave birth to the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure, known as P-TOMS.
It was a relief mechanism consisting of representatives from both the Government and the LTTE, with Norway acting as mediator in the discussions.
The JVP had agreed to contest the 2004 election with Chandrika only on the condition that she would not sign any agreement with the LTTE that could be seen as compromising Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.
The party had also insisted that there should be no negotiations with the LTTE under Norwegian mediation.
According to this account, Chandrika violated all those conditions.
By then, pressure was also building inside the JVP.
Many party members believed the Government was becoming increasingly unpopular because of the fallout from the tsunami disaster.
They argued that the party should withdraw from the administration before it was forced to carry the burden of the Government’s declining public support.
Although JVP ministers frequently clashed with Chandrika inside Cabinet, they were initially reluctant to leave the Government outright.
Eventually, however, the party concluded that remaining in office would make it share responsibility for the Government’s failures.
The P-TOMS agreement gave the JVP the perfect opening to break away.
As soon as Chandrika signed the agreement, the JVP withdrew from the Government.
The withdrawal was presented as a principled stand, and the party regained much of the public support it had begun to lose.
It was this renewed political momentum that later enabled the JVP to play a decisive role in helping Mahinda Rajapaksa win the presidency.
After Mahinda became President, the JVP was uncertain whether it should formally join his administration.
Mahinda, for his part, was also reluctant to bring the JVP fully into government and risk creating new tensions.
By then, he had resumed peace talks with the LTTE under Norwegian mediation, placing the JVP in a politically difficult position.
The JVP realised that its nationalist credentials could be weakened by Mahinda’s negotiations with the LTTE.
Yet, unlike its break with Chandrika, an immediate split from Mahinda would have made the party appear inconsistent and opportunistic.
Instead, the JVP successfully pressured Mahinda toward a military solution.
However, during the early stages of the war, Mahinda’s government faced LTTE air attacks and several military setbacks.
The wartime economy came under severe strain, people faced growing hardship, and Sri Lanka was further affected by the global economic crisis.
The JVP calculated that Mahinda would be unable to win the war.
It feared that if the conflict dragged on, the country would face economic collapse and that part of the blame could eventually fall on the party.
At the same time, relations worsened as Mahinda attracted nationalist figures from within JVP ranks, including Wimal Weerawansa.
As a result, the JVP decided to defeat Mahinda’s 2008 Budget and leave the Government.
Before that could happen, however, Mahinda managed to split the JVP and secure parliamentary approval for the Budget.
According to this narrative, after helping both Chandrika Kumaratunga and Mahinda Rajapaksa come to power, the JVP eventually distanced itself from them because it did not want to carry responsibility for the consequences of governing alongside them.
Today, however, the situation is fundamentally different.
The Government itself is led by the JVP.
Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the leader of the JVP, is now the President of Sri Lanka.
Any successes or failures of the Government now fall directly on the party’s shoulders.
Can the JVP separate itself from Anura the way it once separated itself from Chandrika and Mahinda?
That is the central question.
Anura is not an outsider to the party.
He is the leader of the JVP.
When the party broke away from Chandrika, she was the leader of the SLFP.
When it distanced itself from Mahinda, he too was the leader of the SLFP.
In both cases, the JVP was separating from leaders of another political party.
It cannot follow the same path with Anura.
To distance itself from him, the JVP would first have to remove him as party leader and appoint someone else in his place.
The JVP is not like most other political parties.
Historically, it has shown that it is willing to replace leaders when necessary.
That is how it removed Somawansa Amarasinghe.
But Somawansa, at that time, was only a party leader.
Anura today is not merely the leader of the JVP.
He is also the Executive President of Sri Lanka.
Viewed in that context, removing him would be far from easy.
It would be politically explosive and internally devastating.
For the JVP, such a move would be similar to strapping on a suicide vest and charging into its own headquarters in Pelawatte.
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